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Abstract
Using data from a nationally representative sample of telecommunications
establishments, this study finds that HR practices and workforce unionization influence
managerial pay levels and the ratio of manager-to-worker pay. High performance HR practices,
including investment in the skills of the workforce, in computer-based technologies, and in
performance-based worker pay practices, are all positively related to managerial pay; but the
use of workforce teams, which shift some managerial responsibilities to workers, has the
opposite association. High performance HR practices also are associated with lower manager-
to-worker pay differentials. In addition, workforce unionization is positively associated with
managerial pay levels, with worker base pay mediating the relationship between managers' pay
and unionization.
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How High Performance Human Resource Practices
 and Workforce Unionization Affect Managerial Pay
In recent years, compensation researchers have challenged the notion that variation in
wages can be accounted for solely by explanations derived from human capital and other
conventional economic theories.  Studies have found persistent inter-organizational differences
in pay levels after controlling for employee human capital and factors such as industry and size
(Eisenhart, 1988; Gerhart & Milkovich, 1990; Groshen and Kreuger, 1990).  These findings
support the notion that organizations possess a measure of discretion in setting compensation
policies, resulting in variation in pay levels between similarly situated organizations.
The nature of the factors influencing managerial compensation, however, is less well
understood.  Most research on managerial pay has focused on top executives, and has
examined agency problems involved in alignment of owner and top management interests
(Barkema & Gomez-Mejia, 1998) or whether variation in such characteristics as ownership
structure, profitability, or business risk predict compensation levels (Finkelstein & Hambrick,
1989; Hambrick & Finkelstein, 1995).  Some recent studies have extended these models to
middle-level managers (Bloom & Milkovich 1996, 1998).
There is reason to believe, however, that the pay of middle managers may be equally or
more influenced by lower level organizational factors.  While top executives are primarily
responsible for corporate profitability and shareholder wealth, lower level line managers are
primarily responsible for operational performance.  While corporations often seek to tie a portion
of middle managers' pay to corporate financial performance, these managers also are likely to
be rewarded for their contribution to the organization – their ability to effectively manage the
production systems for which they are responsible.  One way they can affect production
outcomes is by implementing "high performance" human resource (HR) practices -- those that
invest in the skills and abilities of employees, design work in ways that facilitate employee
collaboration in problem solving, and provide incentives to motivate workers to use their
discretionary effort (Appelbaum et al, 2000; Delery and Doty, 1996).  A growing body of
empirical research shows that these practices indeed are associated with better performance
(Becker & Gerhart, 1996; Ichniowski et al., 1996; Appelbaum et al., 2000).  If these practices
lead to better organizational performance, then it is reasonable to consider whether managers
are rewarded for implementing them. High performance HR practices may affect managerial
pay directly, by altering the complexity of managers’ jobs, or indirectly, by raising workers’
productivity and pay, which in turn may lead to upward internal equity adjustments.
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Managers’ pay also may be affected by union pressures.  Unions, for example, may
directly affect managerial pay by constraining managerial prerogative and increasing the
complexity of managers' jobs.  Workforce unionization may indirectly affect managerial pay
levels through unions’ ability to negotiate higher wages for workers, with companies seeking to
maintain manager-to-worker pay ratios for internal equity reasons.  No prior research, however,
has examined the relationship between workforce unionization and managerial pay levels.
Thus, in contrast to the literature that views middle managers’ pay from the top down, we
examine managerial pay as a function of “bottom-up” factors that influence operational
performance and the complexity of their jobs.  We focus on both the absolute levels of manager
pay and the ratio of manager-to worker pay for middle and lower level line managers (second
and third tier managers above first line supervisors).  We consider these issues using data from
a nationally representative survey of customer service and sales centers in the
telecommunications services industry.  This industry-specific focus allows us to analyze detailed
measures of variation in business and HR practices.  The industry is an appropriate one to
examine because, like many others, the proportion of managerial employees has increased
dramatically over the last two decades, from 10.1 percent in 1980 to 22 percent in 1997 (CPS,
1998).
Theory and Hypotheses
In the first major investigation of the compensation of middle managers, Gerhart and
Milkovich (1990) found significant inter-organizational variation in compensation levels, even
after controlling for the human capital of managers and differences in the organizational
characteristics, such as size and sales and profitability. Other studies have demonstrated a
positive relationship between manager's pay and education and tenure (Abowd, 1990; Leonard,
1990; Fisher & Govindarajan, 1992; Werner & Tosi, 1995; Bloom & Milkovich, 1998) and
manager's pay and organizational size (Lambert, Larcker, & Weigelt, 1991; Fisher &
Govindarajan, 1992; Werner & Tosi, 1995; Bloom & Milkovich, 1998).  A recent study showed
that individual characteristics account for about half of inter-industry wage differentials and firm
heterogeneity accounts for the other half (Abowd and Kramarz, 2000).
Recent research on executive pay has examined two other factors as determinants of
managerial compensation: ownership structure and degree of business risk faced by firms.  Two
studies (Werner & Tosi, 1995; Mueller & Yun, 1997) examined the relationship between
ownership structure and middle managers' pay and found that middle managers in manager-
controlled companies received higher pay than those in owner-controlled companies. Also,
Bloom and Milkovich (1998) analyzed the relationship between degree of business risk and
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middle managers' pay and found that, contrary to expectations, managers in firms facing higher
levels of business risk (measured in volatility in stock prices and variation in return on assets)
received lower proportions of incentive pay; but depending on the type of risk and ownership
structure, they may receive higher levels of base pay.   In brief, the compensation literature has
approached variation in middle manager pay from ‘above’, by applying the literature on
executive compensation to lower level managers.
An alternative approach is to view managers' pay as a function of the way they manage
the workforce for which they are responsible.  Recent literature documents wide inter-firm
variation in HR practices, variation that reflects differences in firm-level strategic human
resource decisions (Cappelli, 1999; Katz & Darbishire, 2000).   Within firms, managers also vary
in their ability or willingness to implement the strategic initiatives of top management.  Building
on this line of reasoning, we view middle manager's pay as a function of their implementation of
high performance human resource practices.  Managerial pay may be affected indirectly, in
response to the effects of HR practices on the productivity and pay of workers; or directly, by
affecting the complexity of managers' jobs.  Similarly, workforce unionization may influence
manager's pay indirectly, through their effect on workers' pay, or directly, by increasing the
complexity of managers' jobs.  In the following sections we outline the hypothesized
relationships between managers' pay and the use of high performance HR practices, subject to
the pressures exerted by unions.
High Performance HR Practices and Managerial Pay
The use of high performance work systems has gained widespread interest in recent
years as the source of competitive advantage (e.g., Pf ffer, 1998).  Researchers have identified
three interrelated dimensions of these systems that are hypothesized to contribute to
organizational performance: high relative skills of the workforce; the opportunity to use those
skills (e.g. employee discretion and participation in teams); and incentives, such as
performance-based pay, to induce commitment and discretionary effort (e.g. MacDuffie, 1995;
Delery & Doty, 1996; Appelbaum et al, 2000).  A fourth dimension that typically accompanies
the use of high performance HR practices is the use of advanced information-based
technologies that require a computer-literate workforce.  A growing body of evidence suggests
that high performance HR practices, in combination with new technology, produce better
productivity, quality, sales, and financial performance (Arthur, 1992; Bailey, 1998; Black &
Lynch, 1998; MacDuffie, 1995; Huselid, 1995; Becker & Gerhart, 1996; Youndt, Snell, Dean, &
Lepak, 1996; Ichniowski, et al, 1997; Batt, 1999; Appelbaum et al, 2000).
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If high performance HR practices lead to better organizational performance, then
manager pay may be higher where these practices are present due to the higher skills,
productivity, and pay of workers in these systems.  Through this channel, managers benefit
indirectly from the effects of high performance HR practices on workers.  This argument draws
on human capital theory and is consistent with the economic literature that views increased
wage variation as a function of  “skill biased technical change” (e.g., Johnson, 1997).
Economists have argued that new technologies have increased the demand for skill, thereby
raising the relative wages of higher skilled workers.  If technology is defined to include both
hardware (e.g., computer systems) and soft technologies (e.g., HR practices), then it is
reasonable to suspect that variation in the use of high performance HR practices may explain
wage outcomes of workers.  We extend this argument by examining whether this technologically
induced variation in workers' jobs and wages exerts indirect effects on manager pay.
Researchers only recently have begun to examine the links between high performance
HR practices and worker pay, and the evidence to date is mixed.  In a longitudinal study using a
nationally representative sample of establishments, Osterman (2000) found no evidence that
establishments with high performance practices paid higher wages to workers than other firms.
In contrast, in a study of the steel, apparel, and medical instruments industries, Appelbaum et
al. (2000) found that the use of high performance systems was associated with higher wages.
Similarly, Hunter and Lafkas (1998) found that the interactive effect of more autonomous work
organization and new technology produced higher wages for retail bank workers.  Other studies
of self-managed teams, a key component of high performance systems, have found that
workers in teams received higher wages because they worked more overtime to absorb
supervisory tasks (Weisman et al., 1993; Batt, 2000).  In sum, it is possible that managers who
implement high performance HR systems receive higher pay indirectly because the operations
and workforce they manage are more productive. However, no studies have yet examined this
relationship.
The pay of managers who implement high performance HR practices also may be
affected as these work practices alter the complexity of managers’ jobs (a direct influence of
these HR practices).  For purposes of this discussion, it is useful to consider whether and how
each of the dimensions of high performance systems – the use of a higher skilled workforce,
advanced information technologies, teams, and performance-based worker pay – might directly
affect the complexity of managerial jobs.  First, with respect to human capital of the workforce, it
is likely that managers of higher skilled workers would themselves need to have higher skills,
particularly interpersonal skills.  In the shift from a command-and-control to a participative
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management system, for example, some research shows that managers need more
sophisticated interpersonal and leadership skills (e.g., Manz and Sims, 1987; Stewart and
Manz, 1997).
Investment in new technologies also is likely to affect the skill requirements of
managerial jobs.  Management theorists have generally distinguished between technology used
to inform or complement workforce capabilities (nformating) and technology used as a
substitute to reduce the labor content of jobs (automating) and control labor (e.g., Zuboff, 1988).
Informating uses of technology are consistent with the use of high performance HR practices.
In manufacturing, for example, the use of computers for statistical process control requires the
selection and training of computer-literate workers (MacDuffie, 1995).  An analogous use of
technology in the context of customer service centers in this study is to develop a rich database
of information on customers to enhance workers’ ability to sell and customize products.  They
also can use email and on-line resources for updating information on products, pricing, and
procedures.  Where firms use these types of systems, managers as well as workers need to be
computer literate. An alternative approach to technology in call centers is to use it primarily as a
control system to electronically monitor workers' performance.  This approach is consistent with
an engineering or production line approach to services -- allowing the use of low skilled workers
in low-paid, low-discretion jobs (Levitt, 1972).  Because electronic monitoring is a substitute for
managerial monitoring, it simplifies the work of managers and is likely to be associated with
lower manager pay levels.
The second dimension of high performance systems – the use of workforce teams –
allows employers to shift some operational decisions to workers, who are viewed as having
more tacit knowledge than managers for making decisions close to the point of production.
Considerable research shows that reorganizing work into teams, especially self-managed
teams, alters the locus of control between managers and workers, with workers absorbing some
tasks previously performed by lower level managers. Research also shows that lower level
managers often have resisted workforce teams because they infringe on managers’ power,
authority, and job security (e.g., Buchanan & Preston, 1991; Klein, 1984; Muller-Jentsch, 1995;
Schlesinger and Klein, 1987). While no research has examined the relationship between
workforce teams and managerial pay, these arguments suggest that the use of workforce teams
will be associated with lower managerial pay levels because some managerial tasks are shifted
to workers.
The third dimension of high performance systems, performance-based worker pay, is
unlikely to have direct implications for managerial pay, but may have indirect effects. Manager
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pay levels will be directly affected by their own performance-based pay.  Managerial pay,
however, may be indirectly affected by the use of performance-based pay among workers
because this form of compensation is likely to induce greater effort on the part of workers,
resulting in better organizational performance, and managers may share in these productivity
improvements.
In sum, this discussion suggests the following set of hypotheses:
H1a: Investment in a high skilled workforce and in i formating technologies will be
associated with higher managerial pay levels.
H1b: Work organized to give non-managerial employees greater discretion through
participation in teams will be associated with lower managerial pay levels.
H1c: HR incentives for workers, such as performance-based pay, will be associated with
higher managerial pay levels.
So far we have offered hypotheses related to the level of managerial pay. The general
argument is that if high performance HR practices produce better organizational performance
and these gains are shared, then both worker and managerial pay should be higher.  If the
gains from high performance practices are shared equally, then manager-to-worker pay ratios
might be unaltered.  However, as indicated above, some dimensions of high performance
systems, particularly the use of teams, may alter the relative compensation of managers and
workers.
Other arguments also suggest that manager-to-worker pay ratios may be lower in
establishments that use high performance HR practices.  As a general principle, high
performance practices are likely to have a greater effect on the skills and jobs of workers than of
managers because workers are the focus of the HR practices.  If we consider the dimensions of
high performance systems discussed above, manager-to-worker skill and pay differentials are
likely to be compressed because high performance systems raise the skills, responsibilities, and
contributions made by workers relative to managers.  If workers’ skill requirements rise more
than do those for managers, then human capital theory would predict that the wages of workers
would rise relative to those of managers, reducing the managerial wage premium.  Similarly,
variation in technology is likely to have more direct implications for the skills and pay of workers
using the technology than for managers.  Thus, where technology is used to informate
production work, consistent with high performance practices, then the wages of workers should
rise relatively more than those of managers, resulting in a lower manger-to-worker pay ratio
(and conversely, electronic monitoring is likely to increase the manager-to-worker pay gap).
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Second, as noted above, if teams shift the relative roles and responsibilities between
managers and workers, essentially narrowing the gap in relative status and contribution to the
organization, then the manager-to-worker pay ratio is likely to be lower than would otherwise be
the case.  A similar outcome is likely with respect to performance-based pay. Compared to
workers, managers typically have a higher percentage of pay that is variable; and evidence
suggests that performance-based pay is associated with higher pay levels.  Thus, if firms
increase the percent of workers’ pay that is variable relative to that of managers, then the
manager-to-worker pay ratio should be lower than would otherwise be the case.
Finally, other organizational effects may provide a further rationale for lower manager-to-
worker pay ratios under high performance work systems.  MacDuffie (1995), for example,
argued that lower manager-to-worker status differentials were an important part of Japanese
lean production systems.  Levine and D’Andrea Tyson (1990) argued that compressing
manager-to-worker pay differentials can increase group cohesiveness and  “reinforce the
atmosphere of participation” (p. 211). Some empirical studies show that reduced inter-group pay
differentials are associated with better organizational performance (Cowherd & Levine, 1992;
Bloom, 1998; Pfeffer & Langton, 1993; Drago & Garvey, 1998).  Thus, if reduced manager-to-
worker pay ratios help elicit the level of worker participation needed for high performance
systems to function effectively, then organizations that adopt these systems are likely to
redesign compensation systems in ways that reduce pay differentials.  In sum, these arguments
suggest the following two hypotheses:
H2a: High performance HR practices will be associated with lower manager-to-worker pay
ratios.
H2b: The use of informating technologies will be associated with lower manager-to-worker
pay ratios and electronic monitoring will have tbe opposite association.
The Influence of Workforce Unionization on Managerial Pay
Extensive research has documented the existence of a union wage premium, with
unionized workers receiving approximately 15 to 20 percent higher wages than similarly situated
nonunion workers (Freeman, 1980, 1984; Lewis, 1986; Jakubson, 1991; Raphael, 2000).  This
research also has shown that unions reduce the white collar/blue collar wage premium by
raising the level of blue collar wages (Freeman and Medoff 1984).  Due to the exclusion of
managers from coverage by the National Labor Relations Act, any wage premium obtained
through collective bargaining only applies to the workers who are in the bargaining unit and not
to managerial employees.  As a result, the direct effect of union representation should be to
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raise the wages of workers relative to managers, thereby reducing the manager-to-worker pay
ratio.
There are reasons to believe, however, that unions also exert indirect effects on
manager pay levels, albeit of smaller size than for workers.  First, there may be "spillover"
effects, as firms pass on union-negotiated wage increases to managers in order to enhance
perceptions of intra-organizational distributive justice (Cowherd & Levine, 1992).  Institutional
theory (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Eisenhardt, 1988) also provides a related rationale for why
organizations would attempt to maintain existing manager-to-worker wage differentials within
the organization.  Collective bargaining may serve as a mechanism through which norms about
appropriate wage increases become institutionalized within the organization, with expectations
developed that managers will receive pay increases corresponding to those obtained by
unionized workers.  In his study of managers in the auto industry, for example, MacDuffie
(1996:95) showed that from 1948 to the early 1980s, the big three auto makers routinely passed
on to salaried employees the pay and benefit increases negotiated by the auto workers union.
In addition, unionization may affect managerial compensation more directly by adding a
level of complexity to managers' jobs.  Unions, for example, may make it difficult for managers
to exercise their prerogative or unilaterally introduce innovative work practices.  Thus, middle
managers in unionized workplaces are likely to need more interpersonal and negotiating skills.
They are likely to have to negotiate with the union or set up on-going labor-management
committees as a prerequisite for union support for high performance HR practices. For these
reasons, we hypothesize that the institution of unionization will be associated with higher
manager pay but only modest reductions in manager-to-worker pay ratios.
H3a: Unionization of workers will be associated with higher manager pay levels.
H3b: Worker base pay will partially mediate the relationship between workforce unionization
and managerial pay levels.




The data for this study come from a nationally representative random sample drawn
from the Dun and Bradstreet listing of telecommunications establishments. Establishments were
stratified by state and size, with all states represented and almost all establishments with more
than 100 employees included.  Smaller establishments were stratified by SIC code so that the
total sample reflects the relative proportion of establishments in the three segments of the
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industry: wireline (SIC 4813); cellular (SIC 4812); and cable TV (SIC 4841).  Because Internet
service providers (ISPs) are an important new part of the industry that is not well captured by
SIC code, additional ISPs were identified through the Directory of National Dial-up Providers
and Area Codes of Operation.
A university-based survey team administered the survey by telephone in the Fall of
1998.  Respondents were the top (general) managers in charge of customer service and sales
(call) centers.  The telephone interviews averaged 52 minutes and yielded 354 usable
responses, representing a 54 percent response rate.  Information from the Dun and Bradstreet
establishment database allowed us to check the repr sentativeness of the respondents on a
number of dimensions.  There were no statistically significant differences between respondents
and non-respondents on whether or not the establishment was publicly or privately held, a
branch of a larger organization, or owned by a former Bell company.  Internet service providers
were somewhat less likely to respond, perhaps because they are less likely than other
segments to self-identify with the telecommunications industry.  Smaller establishments were
somewhat more likely to respond than larger establishments. Missing values randomly
distributed in the data reduced the final sample for the multivariate equations to 238.  We tested
whether there are statistically significant differences in the variables of interest between the full
sample and the reduced sample, and found none.
Measures
Dependent Variables
The dependent variables in the study are the natural log of the median pay of managers
and the ratio of median pay of managers to workers, at the establishment level.   This measure
excludes first line supervisors and captures a relatively narrow band of lower and middle-level
(2nd and 3rd tier) managers.  First line supervisors were specifically excluded because many first
line supervisors in the industry are promoted from the ranks of non-managerial workers (Batt,
1996) and thus their labor markets might be more similar to that of workers than 2nd and 3rd tier
managers, most of whom have a college degree.  The average call center in this study has 181
customer service employees and 1 layer of managers between the first line supervisor and the
top (general) manager or director of the center.  Larger centers tend to have 2 layers of
managers between the supervisor and center director.
The measure of median pay of managers is based on asking the call center's top
manager, “what are the annual earnings of a typical full-time manager in your establishment?
(by 'typical' we mean that about half the managers are paid more and about half are paid less).”
We asked respondents to include base pay and performance-based pay such as profit-sharing,
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gainsharing, and bounuses, but exclude stock options and employer contributions to benefits.
We also collected measures of total compensation, including benefits; however since this
measure substantially increased the amount of missing data and yielded generally similar
results, we did not include it in the results reported here.
The ratio of manager-to-worker pay was constructed by comparing the median pay of
managers to the same measure of pay for “core” workers, defined as the largest group of non-
managerial employees who perform the core production work of the establishment. Given that
our focus is on determinants of differences in pay levels rather than perceptions of pay inequity,
we use the ratio of absolute pay levels.   By contrast, an interest in perceptions of inequity has
led some researchers to focus on relative pay levels, using as a measure of pay level the salary
as a percentile of salaries in the relevant external labor market (e.g. Cowherd & Levine, 1992).
Independent Variables
Our measures of high performance HR practices capture the practices used to manage
core workers in the establishment.  We drew on prior literature to develop indicators of three
dimensions of high performance practices: the relative skill requirements of core jobs, the
design of work to enhance employee discretion through participation in teams, and the use of
performance-based pay.  We also measured variation in the use of information technology.  To
capture skill requirements of the jobs, we used measures of human capital typically included in
economic models of wage determination.  This allows us to identify whether technology, work
design, and performance-based pay explain wage variation over and above that explained by
traditional human capital variables.  Included are three measures of skill level: a) years of formal
education of the typical (median) core worker; b) percent of the core workforce with less than 1
year of tenure; and c) percent of the core workforce with more than ten years of tenure.
The technology used in the establishment is measured in two ways: as an information
resource that is complementary to high performance HR practices (“informating”) and as a
control device associated with a production line approach to HR management.  Technology as
an information resource is measured by the number of emails sent by management to
employees each day to update them on information regarding products, procedures, or
regulations.  Technology as a control device is represented by the percent of workers’
performance that is electronically monitored each day.
Work design is measured by participation of workers in two types of teams: the percent of core
workers that participate in regular off-line problem-solving groups and the percent that
participate in self-directed teams.  For performance-based pay, we asked the general manager
to consider the pay of the typical (as defined above) core worker.  Performance-based worker
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pay includes profit-sharing, gainsharing, commission pay, and bonuses not included in base
pay.  Given the sales environment of this study, most (84 percent) of performance-based pay is
accounted for by commission pay.
Union presence is measured by a dummy variable (where 1 = union, and 0 = nonunion)
representing whether or not the core workforce in the establishment is unionized.  Because we
used a narrow definition of core workers that was consistent with bargaining unit definitions, the
workforce in each establishment was either entirely union or nonunion.
Control Variables
We included economic, organizational, human capital, and HR control variables that are
likely to influence managerial pay. The establishment’s economic environment is measured by
two variables: a) the average unemployment rate for 1998 in the county where the
establishment is located, based on the Local Area Unemployment Statistics of the Bureau of
Labor Statistics; and b) the local cost of living for 1998, drawn from the Economic Research
Institute’s Geographic Reference Report.   Market success is measured by the change in the
establishment’s sales in the prior two years (–1 = decreased, 0 = remained the same, and 1 =
increased).
With respect to organizational characteristics, we controlled for customer segment
served by the call center.  It is likely that managers of centers serving higher value added
business customers will require higher skills and have more complex jobs than their
counterparts serving residential consumers in commodity markets.  To identify customer
segmentation, establishments were dummy coded into five groups: operator services,
residential target, small business target, large business market, and universal centers that do
not target a particular segment (the omitted category).  Operator services is included because it
represents the lowest valued service channel: while historically a cost center, deregulation has
turned it into a fee-generating business as directory assistance is no longer free.  We also
controlled for establishment size (the natural log of the total number of employees)1.
Manager’s human capital is measured by years of formal education of managers, the
percent of managers with less than one year of company tenure, and the percent of managers
with more than ten years of tenure.  Managers’ performance-based pay is measured by the
                                                
1 We explored a number of other organizational characteristics as control variables that theoretically might affect
managerial pay.  These included whether or not the establishment is part of a Bell company, whether the
establishment is a branch of a larger company, whether the establishment has its own HR department, and the span
of control of the manager.  These were highly correlated with other characteristics, especially organizational size and
unionization.  The branch and Bell company characteristics also are captured by our use of a Huber (1967) technique
to correct for a possible company clustering effect.  B ause these variables used up degrees of freedom and did not
contribute significant explanatory power, they were not included in the final equations.
Managerial Pay CAHRS WP00-12
Page 14
percent of managers’ pay that is variable. Finally, worker base pay is included as a control in the
models estimating manager pay.  The base pay of workers is the natural log of the annual base
pay of the typical (median) core worker.
Analysis
Relationships are analyzed using ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions.  However,
because the data include multiple establishments from some companies, the standard OLS
assumption that observations are independently distributed may be violated.  To deal with this
possibility, we use a Huber (1967) technique to correct for a possible company clustering effect,
providing robust standard errors. We entered groups of independent variables hierarchically into
the equations to examine the added explanatory power of that category of variables.  One of our
dependent variables, the manager-to-worker pay ratio is more difficult to interpret because it is
in ratio form (Cohen and Cohen, 1983, 73-76).  To help analyze the results for this dependent
variable, we first present the results for each of the components of the ratio, i.e. the
denominator, worker pay, and the numerator, manager pay, then present the results for the ratio
itself.
Results
Table 1 reports the means, standard deviations, and correlations among the variables.
The mean annual median pay of managers (not transformed into natural log) is $57,458, and
that of the core workforce is $35,213, yielding a manager-to-worker pay differential of 1.88. The
correlations between variables support several of the hypothesized relationships. In the next
sections, we report regression findings concerning the hypotheses relating to manager and
worker pay levels and then turn to the regression findings concerning manager-to-worker pay
ratios
Manager and Worker Pay Levels
Table 2 reports the unstandardized coefficients and standardized beta coefficients for
regressions with worker and manager pay levels as the dependent variables.  Worker pay level
is the dependent variable in the first model.   Manager pay level is the dependent variable in the
other five models.  Controls for economic indicators and organizational characteristics are not
reported in the table, but are included in all of the regression models.
Worker pay level is the dependent variable in the first model, which includes the control
variables plus the independent variables representing unionization and human resource
practices.  As predicted, unionization has a significant (p<.001) positive association with worker
pay levels.  On average unionized workers receive 19.2 percent higher pay than nonunion
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workers, holding other factors constant2.  Among the human resource practices, both of the
technology variables have the predicted relationships with worker pay.  Number of emails per
day has a significant (p<.01) positive association with worker pay, whereas the percentage of
time workers are electronically monitored has a significant (p<.001) negative association with
worker pay.  As predicted, the percentage of worker pay that is variable also has a significant
(p<.001) positive association with overall worker pay, however neither of the variables
representing teams had significant associations with worker pay in this model.
The second model is the base model for manager pay level and includes only the control
variables (economic environment, organizational characteristics, manager human capital, and
manager variable pay), which together explain 38.1 percent of the variance in manager pay.
Associations for the control variables in the base model are generally as expected.  Education
levels for managers (p<.001) and long tenure for managers (p<.01) have significant positive
associations with manager pay.  In the subsequent four models, the groups of variables
representing unionization, worker base pay, worker skills, and human resource practices are
added hierarchically to this base model to allow examination of the additional variance
explained by each group of variables.
In the third model, the variable representing union presence is added to the base model.
Hypothesis 3a states that the unionization of workers will be associated with higher levels of
manager pay, and hypothesis 3b states that worker pay should partially mediate the relationship
between union presence and manager pay levels.  These hypotheses receive partial support.
Union presence has a significant (p<.053) positive association with manager pay, and the
coefficient estimate indicates a manager pay premium of 9.1 percent in unionized
establishments compared to nonunion establishments.  However, including the union presence
only explains an additional 0.5 percent of the variance in manager pay and this is not a
significant improvement in the model.
                                                
2 Use of a logged dependent variable allows interpretation of effect sizes as percentage changes in the dependent
variable, once the appropriate calculation has been made using the anti-log: % change in DV for a union change in IV
= (eB – 1) * 100.
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Table 1:
Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlation Matrix
Mean S.D. 1 2 3 4 5
1   Ln median worker’s pay 10.334 0.498 1
2   Ln median manager's pay 10.891 0.375 0.629 1
3   Manager-to-worker ratio 1.880 0.736 -0.606 0.196 1
4   Manager education (yrs.) 15.388 1.521 0.328 0.468 0.021 1
5   Manager tenure < 1 yr. (%) 0.111 0.213 -0.020 -0.066 -0.004 0.039 1
6   Manager tenure > 10 yrs. (%) 0.344 0.388 -0.061 0.048 0.139 -0.152 -0.062
7   Manager's % variable pay 0.184 0.198 0.220 0.193 -0.096 0.210 0.111
8   Union presence 0.132 0.339 0.014 0.106 0.064 -0.012 -0.131
9   Worker education (yrs.) 13.661 1.658 0.638 0.429 -0.376 0.380 0.056
10   Worker tenure < 1 yr. (%) 0.278 0.271 -0.208 -0.242 0.028 0.039 0.308
11   Worker tenure > 10 yrs. (%) 0.305 0.344 -0.019 -0.067 -0.034 -0.035 -0.047
12   Emails/hr. 1.409 1.697 0.382 0.311 -0.188 0.147 -0.072
13    % electronically monitored 0.364 0.404 -0.381 -0.155 0.326 -0.130 0.068
14   Offline problem-solving teams 0.515 0.366 0.130 -0.044 -0.187 0.017 0.085
15   Online self-directed teams 0.162 0.322 0.178 0.012 -0.192 0.097 0.063
16   Worker % variable pay 0.193 0.219 0.516 0.203 -0.413 0.141 0.016
6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
6 1
7 -0.129 1
8 0.265 -0.041 1
9 -0.208 0.248 -0.186 1
10 -0.309 -0.061 -0.202-0.020 1
11 0.294 0.018 0.260-0.158 0.074 1
12 -0.177 0.106 -0.050 0.309 -0.005 -0.229 1
13 -0.029 -0.079 0.125-0.328 0.089 -0.007 -0.135 1
14 -0.099 0.092 -0.137 0.156 -0.139 -0.067 0.050 -0.023 1
15 0.000 -0.020 -0.121 0.095 -0.030 -0.052 0.192 0.009 0.211 1
16 -0.143 0.379 -0.209 0.489 -0.031 -0.128 0.201 -0.250 0.071 0.172 1
N = 242.  Note: Values >= |0.128| are significant at p<.05.
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Table 2: Predictors of the Natural Logs of Manager and Worker Pay
Worker Pay (1) Manager Pay (2-6)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Manager' skills & pay Coef. Std. B. Coef. Std. B. Coef. Std. B. Coef. Std. B. Coef. Std. B. Coef. Std. B.
  Mngr. Education (yrs.) 0.019 0.058
  Mngr. Tenure < 1 yr. 0.131 0.056 0.091 0.368*** 0.090 0.366*** 0.070 0.285*** 0.062 0.250*** 0.066 0.268***
  Manager tenure > 10 yrs. -0.020 -0.016 -0.153 -0.087 -0.138 -0.079 -0.157 -0.089 -0.100 -0.057 -0.052 -0.030
  Mngr's % variable pay -0.062 -0.025 0.136 0.140** 0.116 0.120* 0.092 0.095* 0.104 0.108+ 0.112 0.116*
Unionization 0.290 0.153* 0.284 0.150* 0.360 0.190** 0.281 0.149* 0.150 0.079
  Union presence 0.176 0.120
  Worker base pay *** 0.087 0.079+ 0.006 0.006 0.026 0.024 0.005 0.005
Workforce HR practices 0.325 0.410*** 0.288 0.364*** 0.389 0.491***
 Worker skills
  Core education (yrs.) 0.091 0.304
  Core tenure < 1 yr. -0.297 -0.162*** 0.045 0.198*** 0.019 0.082
  Core tenure > 10 yrs. 0.153 0.106** -0.155 -0.112+ -0.174 -0.126+
 Technology use * -0.081 -0.074 -0.065 -0.059
  Emails/hr. 0.044 0.149
  % elect. monitored -0.223 -0.181** 0.020 0.090*
 Teams *** 0.080 0.087
  Problem-solving teams 0.053 0.039
  Self-directed teams 0.086 0.055 -0.102 -0.100*
 Incentive pay -0.111 -0.095*
  % wkr. variable pay 0.601 0.264
Constant 8.166*** *** 0.457 0.267***
F statistic 35.200*** 9.014*** 9.049 6.279*** 6.193*** 5.477***
R-squared 0.663 13.760*** 12.930*** 15.080*** 17.460*** 19.950***
Chg. R-squared 0.375 0.381 0.501 0.544 0.599
F for Chg. in R-squared 0.005 0.120 0.044 0.055
1.840 54.589*** 7.200** 6.010**
N = 248. *** = p<.001; ** = p.<.01; * = p<.05; + = p.< .10.,  Note: Market and organizational controls included, but not shown.
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To test for mediation, we followed Baron and Kenny's (1986) procedure and first tested
whether the independent variable (union presence) is significantly related to managerial pay
(model 3 above).  We then tested whether the mediating variable alone (worker base pay added
to model 1) was significantly positively related to manager pay levels and found that it was
(equation not shown).  Third, we tested whether the union coefficient drops in size and
significance in the presence of worker base pay (Table 2, model 4). We found that with the
addition of worker base pay, the union variable became insignificant and the coefficient was
reduced in size to almost zero (from .087 to .006).  While we hypothesized that the union would
affect managerial pay both directly (by increasing the complexity of managers' jobs) and
indirectly (via the union's affect on worker pay levels), our results suggest that the union effect is
fully accounted for by its indirect effects on workers' pay. These results imply that there is no
direct effect via increasing the complexity of managers' jobs.
The fifth model adds the three measures of workers' skills.  As predicted in hypothesis
1a, workers' years of education is significantly positively related to managerial pay levels (p
<.001), while low tenure among workers has a marginally significant (p<.10) negative
association.  Addition of these measures of workers' skill level increases the variance explained
by 4.4 percentage points, which is a significant (p>.01) improvement over the fourth model.
Thus, after controlling for managers' human capital and workers' base pay, the human capital of
workers is significantly related to managers' pay levels.  To give a sense of the magnitude of
these relationships, if the typical worker has 1 additional year of education, manager pay levels
are 1.9 percent higher.
The sixth model adds the five variables measuring technology use, teams, and
performance-based pay.  With the addition of these variables, the coefficient on worker
education becomes insignificant and smaller in size, consistent with the idea that high
performance HR practices are typically used in conjunction with higher skilled workers.  The
results of model 5 show that hypotheses 1a-c are supported for all but 1 of the HR variables.
Hypothesis 1a states that the informating use of technology will be associated with higher
managerial pay, and electronic monitoring with lower pay levels.  The results show that the
number of emails sent by management to workers has a significant (p<.05) positive association
with manager pay, but electronic monitoring is not significant.  Hypothesis 1b states that the use
of teams among workers will be associated with lower managerial pay.  Both problem-solving
teams and self-directed teams have a significant (p<.05) negative association with manager
pay, thus providing support for hypothesis 1b.  Finally, the percent of worker pay that is variable
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has a significant positive association (p<.001) with manager pay levels (after controlling for the
percent of manager pay that is variable), supporting hypothesis 1c.
To give a sense of the magnitude of these relationships, a 10-percentage point increase
in the percent of the workforce in problem-solving teams is associated with a 1 percent lower
pay level for managers.  The same change in the percent of the workforce organized into self-
directed teams is associated with a 1.1 lower pay for managers.  The same increase in the
percent of workers' pay that is variable is associated with 5.6 percent higher manager pay
levels.
Manager-to-Worker Pay Differentials
Table 3 reports the results when the manager-to-worker pay ratio is the dependent
variable in a regression analysis with four hierarchically ordered models.  However, because
median worker pay is used to construct the dependent variable, worker base pay is excluded
from the independent variables in the manage-to-worker pay equations in Table 3.  The first
model in Table 3 includes only the control variables and explains 18 percent of the variance in
the ratio of manager-to-worker pay.  In Model 2, the union variable is added to the first model,
increasing the variance explained by only 0.4 percentage points, which is a non-significant
improvement in the model.  In the third model, the measures of workforce skills are added, and
they explain an additional 7 percent of the variance, which is a significant improvement over the
second model.   The fourth model, which includes the measures of technology use, teams, and
performance-based pay, explains an additional 13.6 percent of the variance, which is a
significant improvement of the model (p<.001).
Hypothesis 3b, which states that workforce unionization will be associated with lower
manager-to-worker pay ratios, receives support in the fourth model.  The relationship between
unionization and the manager-to-worker pay ratio is not statistically significant at even the .10
level when unionization is added in the second model.  However, the coefficient on unionization
increases and becomes statistically significant in the fourth model when the remaining human
resource practice variables are added, indicating that these variables had a suppressor effect
for unionization.  In the fourth model, controlling for variation in human resource practices,
unionized establishments have on average a 23.2 percentage point lower manager-to-worker
pay ratio relative to non-union workplaces.
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Table 3: Predictors of Manager to Worker Pay Ratio
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Coef. Std. B. Coef. Std. B. Coef. Std. B. Coef. Std. B.
Manager' skills & pay
  Mngr. Education (yrs.) 0.054 0.112+ 0.055 0.114+ 0.097 0.201** 0.096 0.199***
  Mngr. tenure < 1 yr. 0.012 0.003 -0.014 -0.004 -0.020 -0.006 -0.104 -0.030
  Manager tenure > 10 yrs. 0.216 0.114+ 0.251 0.132+ 0.260 0.137 0.282 0.149+
  Mngr's % variable pay -0.197 -0.053 -0.187 -0.050 -0.002 -0.001 0.308 0.083
Unionization
  Union presence -0.154 -0.071 -0.130 -0.060 -0.264 -0.122*
Workforce HR practices
 Worker skills
  Core education (yrs.) -0.143 -0.322*** -0.060 -0.136*
  Core tenure < 1 yr. 0.073 0.027 0.016 0.006
  Core tenure > 10 yrs. -0.244 -0.114 -0.255 -0.119+
 Technology use
  Emails/hr. -0.013 -0.029
  % elect. monitored 0.415 0.228***
 Teams
  Problem-solving teams -0.240 -0.119*
  Self-directed teams -0.310 -0.135**
 Incentive pay
  % wkr. Variable pay -0.946 -0.281***
Constant 1.128* 1.067* 2.410*** 1.768***
F statistic 5.700*** 5.410*** 5.180*** 9.060***
Prob > F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
R-squared 0.180 0.184 0.254 0.390
Chg. R-squared 0.004 0.070 0.136
F for Chg. in R-squared 1.12 7.038** 9.809**
N = 248. *** = p<.001; ** = p.<.01; * = p<.05; + = p.< .10.,  Note: Market and organizational controls included, but not shown.
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Hypothesis 2a states that use of teams, informating technology, and worker incentives will
be associated with a lower manager-to-worker pay ratio, whereas Hypothesis 2b predicts that
electronic monitoring will be associated with a higher manager-to-worker pay ratio.  These
arguments receive some support in the third model.  While email use has no significant association
with the ratio of manager-to-worker pay, electronic monitoring is associated with a larger pay gap
between managers and workers (p<.001).  An increase of ten percentage points in the percentage
of worker time that is electronically monitoring is associated with a 5.2 percentage point higher
manager-to-worker pay ratio.
Results for the other human resource practice variables provide strong support for
Hypothesis 2a.  Employee participation in both offline problem-solving teams (p<.10) and online
self-directed teams (p<.001) has significant negative associations with manager-to-worker pay
ratios in the fourth model.  A 10-percentage point increase in employee involvement in problem-
solving teams is associated with a reduction of 2.1 percentage points in the manager-to-worker pay
ratio, and a 10-percentage point increase in participation in self-directed teams is associated with a
reduction in the manager-to-worker pay ratio of 2.7 percentage points.  Finally, the proportion of
worker pay that is variable also has a significant (p<.01) negative association with manager-to-
worker pay ratios.  An increase of ten percentage points in the portion of worker pay that is variable
is associated with a 6.1 percentage point lower manager-to-worker pay ratio.
Discussion
This study investigates the relationship between high performance HR practices, workforce
unionization, and managerial pay in telecommunications service and sales centers.  We find that
high performance HR practices and workforce unionization influence both managerial pay levels
and manager-to-worker pay ratios.  High performance work systems have been promoted on
claims that they provide major economic performance benefits and potential gains for both
employees and organizations.   Our study investigates the effects of high performance HR
practices from a previously unexplored direction, through their relationship with managerial
compensation.  Given that changes in work organization and HR practices associated with high
performance systems are predominantly focused on workers, any relationship with outcomes for
managers might be expected to be attenuated or even absent.
However, we find several statistically significant relationships between high performance
HR practices and pay outcomes.  Our findings suggest that managers benefit through higher pay
levels in establishments that adopt high performance practices.  However, not all high performance
practices are positively related to manager pay.  While high performance HR practices
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conventionally are viewed as representing a coherent system that has a positive relationship to
organizational performance, this study shows the importance of disaggregating the bundle of HR
practices when examining employee outcomes such as pay.  In this case, investment in the
education of the workforce, in computer-based technologies, and in variable worker pay practices
were all positively related to managerial pay, but the use of workforce teams had the opposite
association (albeit of small magnitude).  These findings are consistent with much of the research
showing that managers often resist worker team-based systems.  While the conventional
interpretation of this resistance is that managers’ power and authority is undermined, this study
suggests that the shift in responsibilities from managers to teams of workers may have negative
financial implications for managers as well.  The negative relationship between worker teams and
managerial pay is nonetheless consistent with the fact that teams improve organizational
performance – both by allowing workers to learn from each other and use their skills more
effectively and by lowering indirect labor costs.
Second, in our data, high performance HR practices are associated with lower manager-to-
worker pay differentials and these associations are statistically significant for a number of HR
practices.  The use of worker teams and variable worker pay are particularly strongly associated
with lower pay ratios.  While the literature has suggested that smaller status differentials and pay
compression may be components of high performance systems, we know of no prior studies that
have empirically tested whether high performance systems actually include enhanced
egalitarianism in relative compensation levels.  There are two possible interpretations of this
finding.  For one thing, high performance HR practices may cause a narrowing of pay differentials
by elevating the status and rewards provided to workers relative to those provided to managers.
Alternatively, the forces operating within an organization that lead it to adopt a high performance
system may simultaneously (or previously) lead to narrow pay differentials within the organization.
For example, organizations that start out more egalitarian in their pay practices may be the very
organizations more prone to adopt high performance HR practices.  If these latter forces
predominate, then it would be a mistake to conclude from our findings that high performance HR
practices per se produce narrow manager-to-worker pay differentials.  Longitudinal data on pay
and the use of high performance HR practices would be needed to identify whether there is a
causal connection between these HR practices and manager pay.
Third, we find that the associations between high performance HR practices and manager
pay levels and the ratio of manager-to-worker pay are robust after controlling for other
organizational factors including local economic conditions, sales growth, size of the establishment,
and the customer segment served.  The level of workforce human capital explains variation in
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managers' pay levels after controlling for managers' human capital; and workforce HR practices
explain variation in managers' pay after controlling for the use of performance-based pay among
managers.
Fourth, this study examines how a previously ignored institutional factor, the unionization of
the core workforce, influences managerial compensation. We find that workforce unionization is
positively associated with managerial pay levels, with the union influence occurring entirely through
its effect on the base pay of workers.  Higher managerial pay in unionized establishments appears
to be related to organizations' attempting to maintain internal pay equity rather than to the
enhanced complexity of the managerial function in union workplaces.  These results indicate the
important role that unions play in wage setting, even for a group that might initially seem removed
from such influences.  Unionized establishments also have lower manager-to-worker pay ratios.
Limitations and Future Research
This study focuses on a single operation (service and sales channels) in one industry
(telecommunications services) to better account for context-specific factors such as technology,
work organization, business strategy, and HR practices.  Use of an industry and occupation-
specific population brings with it the inevitable trade-off between greater contextual detail versus
more limited generalizability.  Confirmation of the generalizability of our findings will require similar
contextual analysis of managerial pay in other industries.  However, given the dramatic growth in
the use of call centers across many industries and the similarities in the nature of computer
technology and information processing in these call centers, we suspect that our findings will
generalize to call centers across other industries.
Some other limitations also are inherent in the design of our study.  Because the study is of
a nationally representative sample of establishments, we could not use multiple sources of data.
We attempted to minimize the potential effects of common method bias by use of relatively
objective context-specific questions about customer segments, union presence, and HR practices.
We also compared the study data to external sources, and found consistency between the study
data and Dun & Bradstreet data, union contracts, and the Current Population Survey.
The cross-sectional nature of the data limits the causal inferences that can be drawn from
it.  Another limitation of this study is that we focused on a single organizational level, the
establishment.  Again, this produces a trade-off.  We were able to obtain substantial comparability
between our subjects by focusing on the establishment level, but our findings may not be
generalizable to other managers, such as those at higher levels in the companies.  Although we
employed statistical corrections for firms that have multiple establishments in our data set, we did
not examine any links in managerial compensation between the establishment, divisional and
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corporate levels of the telecommunications companies.  Methodologically, such multi-level linkages
may be better examined through qualitative case study research that provides even greater
contextual detail.
We do identify quantitatively sizeable linkages between high performance HR practices,
union institutions, and managerial pay.  Although we cannot fully clarify the processes through
which these factors influence managerial pay, given the cross-sectional nature of our data, our
findings suggest the importance of further analysis of how business and HR practices affect both
managers and workers in organizations.
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